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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Conclusion
Before the widespread use of liability insurance, the holdings of
the courts in denying intra-family negligence actions were generally
correct. The reasoning of the doctrine might not have been clearly
articulated nor logically presented, but the general revulsion of the
community to such suits was reason enough for their disallowance.
It must be remembered, however, that the immunity doctrine was
established at a time when accident litigation was looked upon as a
private contest between individuals with which society was not con-
cerned; 71 liability was considered as shifting the loss from the person
who suffered it to the person who caused it.72 There is today, how-
ever, an altogether different approach to tort law. Society has a
definite and vital interest in accidents and their resulting losses.
7 3
Furthermore, since section 167(3), which excepts a spouse from
the other spouse's insurance coverage unless the policy specifies such
coverage, is subject to a recent trend to limit its application, it is
poor authority for disallowing personal tort actions between parent
and child.
Upon analysis of the reasons urged for its support, it is clear
that present application of the rule prohibiting suits between parent
and child would be contrary to logic and good reason. The doctrine
should therefore be abolished.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH A GRAND JURY
Objections to the -validity of indictments in recent cases have
spotlighted the problem of grand jury secrecy, especially as it
pertains to unauthorized communications.' The purpose of this note
is to examine this area of the law.
Secrecy has cloaked grand jury proceedings for centuries.2 The
71 See McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST.
JOHN's L. Rav. 255, 258 (1952); BoWMaAN, ELEMENTARY LAW 80 (1929).
72 See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
73 Id. at 549-50.
1 United States v. Powell, Crim. No. 156-15, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1958.
2 See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1939);
Latham v. United States, 226 Fed. 420, 421 (5th Cir. 1915) ; People v. Hulbut,
4 Denio 133, 135 (N.Y. 1847); EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 28 (1906);
8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360, at 716 (3d ed. 1940).
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grand jurors themselves,3 the prosecution staff,4 clerks ) and ste-
nographers, 6 when authorized to be in the grand jury room, are
sworn to secrecy. Although witnesses were not sworn to secrecy
at common law, 7 some states today impose secrecy on them by statute 8
or usage.9 Before the revision of the criminal code in 1948, the
federal courts followed the rule, laid down in the Goodman case,10
that each district court could, in its discretion, require witnesses to
take an oath of secrecy. However, rale 6- (e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, promulgated in 1948, provides that "a juror,
attorney, interpreter or stenographer" may disclose matters only
when so directed by a court.' It further provides that ". . . no
obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in
accordance with this rule." 12 Apparently this language makes the
Goodman case inapplicable.'" Of course, under certain circumstances,
to serve the ends of justice, a court may dispense an individual from
his oath of secrecy. 4
The Purpose of Grand Jury Secrecy
The purposes of the secrecy surrounding grand jury proceedings
have been stated to be:
3FED. R. CRnEr. P. 6(e) ; N.Y. CODE CuM. PRoc. §§ 238-40, 258; Charge to
Grand Jury,. 30 Fed. Cas. 992 (No. 18255) (C.C.D. Cal. 1872); E. parte
Sontag, 64 Cal. 525, 2 Pac. 402 (1884). See Ward Baking Co. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 205 App. Div. 723, 728, 2C0 N.Y. Supp. 865, 869 (3d Dep't
1923) ; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45, 49 (1933) ; State v. Rector,
158 S.C. 212, 155 S.E. 385, 390 (1930) ; EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 96.
4 See Gargotta v. United States, 77 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1935); Latham v.
United States, supra note 2; State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63, 68 (1939).
5 See Gargotta v. United States, supra note 4; State v. Hamlin, 47 Conn.
95, 115 (1879); Gitchell v. People, 146 I1. 175, 33 N.E. 757, 760 (1893);
People v. Hulbut, 4 Denio 133, 135 (N.Y. 1847).
6 Cases cited note 5 supra.
7 See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 518 (9th Cir. 1939);
United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio
1940).
8 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 540-110 (1958); TEXAS CODE CRIa!. PROC
ANN. art. 388 (1958).
9 See Goodman v. United States, supra note 7; State v. Kemp, 124 Conn
639, 1 A.2d 761, 763 (1938).
'
0
.Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939).
11 FED. R. CRIm. P. 6(e).
'12 Ibid.
is In re Hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency of the
United States Senate, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. 111. 1956). See also Orfield, The
Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 348, 353, 356, 357 (1958) where the
author indicates that witnesses were purposely omitted from rule 6(e) in spite
of requests to include them.
14FEO. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §259. See United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 233-34 (1940); People v.
Miller, 257 N.Y. 54, 57, 177 N.E. 306, 307 (1931) ; Barnett v. McClain, 153
Ark. 325, 240 S.W. 415, 416 (1922).
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1) To protect grand jurors from fear of retaliation or pressure
because of their decisions;
2) To prevent the natural hesitancy which a witness might feel in
.testifying if the content of his testimony was to be released;
3) To prevent advance information of an indictment coming
to the knowledge .of the one indicted, thus enabling him to
flee the jurisdiction or to procure perjured testimony in
rebuttal ;
4) To protect the reputation of persons investigated but not
indicted.' 5
It has often been declared that secrecy is for the benefit of the jurors,
the state, and parties investigated, but not for the benefit of the person
indicted. 16
The enumeration of the persons bound to secrecy and the pur-
poses of the secrecy rule indicate that the evil to be avoided is dis-
closure to outsiders of what takes place within the grand jury room.
Information sent into the grand jury room, while possibly raising
other problems, does not involve the same problems or present the
same evils which it is the purpose of grand jury secrecy to prevent.
That the founders of the system never considered communications
to the grand jury a secrecy problem is evident from the development
of the grand jury system.
Originally, the purpose of the grand jury was not to report those
they believed guilty, but "to give up the names of those who are
defamed by common repute . . . of crimes. The composition of the
juries was such that they were 'handing on and "avowing" as their
own a rumor that has been reported to them by others.' "' 17 Since
the jury sat for a relatively small geographical area, each juror was
expected to have personal knowledge of the crimes occurring therein
and it was not unusual for a juror to initiate charges of his own
knowledge.?8 It was also permissible for private citizens to initiate
charges against their neighbors-usually those whose crimes affected
15 See In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.D.C. 1952); United States
v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 245 (N.D. Ohio 1940); United States
v. Amazon Indus. Chen. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D.C. Md. 1931) ; 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2360, at 722 (3d ed. 1940).
16 United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 304 (D.C. Cal. 1952). See
United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 244 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
17 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 642 (2d ed. 1899).
See also EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 11 (1906) ; I HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 313-23 (3d ed. 1922); PLUNKEYT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COmMON LAW 106-10 (4th ed. 1948).
Is See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 60 (1906); United States v. Central
Supply Ass'n, 34 F. Supp. 241, 243 (N.D. Ohio 1940); EDWARDS, op. Cit.
supra note 17, at 11.
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them.'9 Later, when the area for which each grand jury was re-
sponsible was extended, the jurors relied not on rumor or repute,
but on the information of others or their own knowledge. 20  The
custom of private prosecutions fell into disuse when the state itself
took a firm lead in prosecuting crimes.21 Hence, we see that his-
torically there was no limitation on persons presenting their views
before a grand jury nor on the type of evidence which could be
received by a grand jury. The jurors had the right to base indict-
ments on any type of evidence they had-their own knowledge, rumor
or common repute.
Today in federal jurisdictions the evidence before the grand
jury must satisfy the grand jurors of the accused's guilt.2 2 There
is no requirement that evidence before federal grand juries must be
legally admissible before a trial jury.23 Actually, it has been held
that an indictment returned solely on hearsay evidence will not be
set aside.2 4  A question has arisen as to the desirability of indict-
ments based on non-legal evidence-the Supreme Court apparently
sustaining indictments valid on their face 25 with one Justice insisting
that the evidence before the grand jury be rationally persuasive of
the accused's guilt.20  There is some lower court support for in-
validating indictments based solely on illegally obtained wiretap evi-
dence; evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure; or evidence
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights under the fifth
amendment.
2 7
In New York, the indictment must be based on evidence legally
admissible before a trial jury 28 and sufficient to warrant a verdict
of guilty at trial. 29  However, in spite of the requirement of legal
evidence, inadmissible evidence before a grand jury will not invalidate
an indictment if prejudice is not shown and if there existed at least
ca base of legal evidence sufficient to indict.30
19 See Hale v. Henkel, supra note 18, at 59; United States v. Central Supply
Ass'n, supra note 18, at 243; EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 7, 9-10.
20 EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 7.
21 See United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, supra note 18, at 243;
EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 17, at 7.
22 FED. t_ CRI. P. 6(f).
23 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
24 Ibid.
25 Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 349-50 (1958) ; Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).26 Costello v. United States, supra note 25, at 364 (concurring opinion).
See also United States v. Geller, 154 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
27 United States v. Powell, Crim. No. 156-15, S.D.N.Y., July 22, 1958, p.
23 (dictum).
28 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 249.
29 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC § 251; People v. Leary, 305 N.Y. 793, 113 N.E.2d
303 (1953) ; People v. McGahan, 195 Misc. 707, 281 N.Y. Supp. 249 (Rensselaer
County Ct. 1935).
30 People v. Feld, 305 N.Y. 322, 113 N.E.2d 440 (1953) ; People v. Sexton,
187 N.Y. 495, 80 N.E. 396 (1907); People v. Shea, 147 N.Y. 78, 41 N.E. 505
(1895).
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When moving to quash indictments, the defendant has the
burden of showing insufficiency of evidence 31 or actual prejudice. 32
The defendant is required to show a reasonable basis for believing
these defects to exist before the judge will consider a motion to
quash.8 3  This makes the defendant's burden severe. Moreover,
the courts as a matter of policy are loath to become involved in
passing on grand jury proceedings and prefer to let the defendant
prove his case before the trial court.3 4
This approach to the problem appears to be sound in the light
of the history of the grand jury system, and the protection afforded
the defendant in a jury trial. In addition, courts save much time by
not becoming involved in technical objections which might require
the perusal of voluminous grand jury minutes.
Communications as a Crime
It is a crime to attempt to corruptly influence the decisions of
a juror.35  This law applies to grand jurors.30  A federal statute
on the subject was passed in 1872 and has been in effect ever since.37
Shortly after this statute was passed, Mr. Justice Field, in his now
famous charge to a grand jury,38 laid down some rules as a guide
to their actions, among which was a prohibition against allowing
. . . private prosecutors to intrude themselves into your presence, and present
accusations. Generally such parties are actuated by private enmity, and seek
merely the gratification of their personal malice.39
He pointed out that the proper course for such a private person
to take was to bring the matter to the attention of the district attorney,
and if he failed to act, to a committing magistrate before whom the,
matter could be investigated. He indicated that if neither of these
parties saw fit to act it would be safe to assume that there was no
reason for the grand jury to be interested. 40 The judge further
3' Carrado v. United States, 210 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
32 See United States v. Amazon Indus. Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 262-64
(D.C. Md. 1931).
33 United States v. Papaioanu, 10 F.R.D. 517, 518 (D.C. Del. 1950).
34 See United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214, 215 (D.C. Conn. 1923);
United States v. Papaioanu, supra note 33; Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175,
33 N.E. 757, 760 (1893).
35 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-04 (1952); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 376, 376-a; United
States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921) ; People v. Glen, 173 N.Y. 395, 66 N.E.
112 (1903).
36 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-04 (1952); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 370 (Supp. 1958).
37 REv. STAT. §§ 5404-05 (1875) which was the original version of the
present statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-04 (1952).
38 Charge to the Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992 (No. 18255) (C.C.D. Cal.
1872).




stated that a rash of private communications ". . . filled with
malignant and scandalous imputations upon the conduct and acts
of those against whom the writers entertained hostility . . ." had
descended upon previous grand juries. "All such communications
are calculated to prevent and obstruct the due administration of
justice .... ,, 41 He then quoted from Judge King in Commissioner
ex rel. Jack v. Crans: 42
Let any reflecting man be he layman or lawyer, consider of the consequences
which would follow, if every individual could at his pleasure throw his malice
or his prejudice into the grand jury room, and he will of necessity conclude
that the rule of law which forbids all communications with grand juries,
engaged in criminal investigations, except through -the public instructions
of courts, and the testimony of sworn witnesses, is a rule of safety to the
community.43
Mr. Justice Field then mentioned the new federal act passed
to prevent the continuance of this "pernicious" practice. He quoted
from Revised Statutes, sections 5404-44 and 5405, 4 and concluded
that it was the intent of Congress to protect jurors "... from intimi-
dation or personal influence of any kind." 4"
It must be noted that the evil of which Mr. Justice Field was
warning consisted of communications which in fact were attempts
to influence the jurors. When he stated "all such communications
are calculated to prevent and obstruct the due administration of
justice .. ." 47 he had in mind those communications to which he
had just referred, namely, actual attempts to influence. Again, in
the quotation from Judge King 48 we note that the judge spoke of
a communicant injecting his private malice or prejudice into the grand
jury room and gave the impression that all communications were
outlawed to protect the safety of the community. Yet, in that veiy
case, it appears that a letter written to the same grand jury by a
county commissioner, urging them to ignore the defendant's attempt
to influence them, was not considered a crime. The court dis-
tinguished the character of the remarks and the motives of the com-
missioner.4 9 It would appear that although all communications are
forbidden, not all are crimes. The motives of the sender and the
nature of the communication have some bearing on the matter.
The process of solidifying the Field charge as it refers to
communications with a grand jury was aided by dictum in United
41 Id. at 995.
422 Clark 172, 3 Pa. L.J. 442 (1844).
43 Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. 992, 995 (No. 18255) (C.C.D. Cal.
1872).44 REv. STAT. § 5404 (1875).
45 REV. STAT. § 5405 (1875).
46 Charge to Grand Jury, supra note 43, at 995.
47 Ibid.
48 See text accompanying note 43 supra.
"9 Commissioner ex rel. Jack v. Crans, 2 Clark 172, 3 Pa. L.J. 442 (1844).
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States v. Kilpatrick 50 where the court states that Mr. Justice Field
"... dwelt at some length and referred to high authority, urging the
importance of securing grand juries against outside influences and
improper interferences.... ,
In Duke v. United States 5 2 the defendant was being investigated
on suspicion of crime. Believing that an indictment would be re-
turned against him, he sent the grand jurors a letter containing his
version of the facts, asking them to ignore hearsay evidence, and
giving certain high officials as character references. An indictment
and prosecution under the federal statute 53 followed. At the trial,
"the court charged the jury that the act of the defendant in delivering
the letter to the grand jury, for the purpose of being considered by
it, amounted to an attempt to influence the action of the grand jury
within the meaning of the statute." 54 The court of appeals held that
this charge was correct.5 5 It would appear that the court was im-
plying that any communication would violate the statute, especially
when it stated:
Congress for the protection of grand and petit jurors from this sort of
interference has not only forbidden attempts to influence them "corruptly,
or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication" . . .
but has also forbidden any attempt to influence by the sending of any letter
relating to any matter pending before them.56
However, the court appeared to back away from such a con-
clusion when it immediately afterwards said, "cases can be imagined
in which a serious question might arise as to whether a letter was an
attempt to influence within the meaning of the statute. . .. " 57 It
went on to hold that the letter under consideration on its face
showed that it was intended to influence the grand jury, "and one
who knowingly sends a letter to a grand jury which shows upon its
face the intention that it shall be considered with respect to a pending
case, cannot be heard to say that he did not attempt to influence
the grand jury thereby, as the intent to influence is inherent in the
act of knowingly sending such a letter." 58
50 16 Fed. 765 (W.D.N.C. 1883).
51 Id. at 771.
5290 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1937).
53 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1946). "Whosoever shall attempt to influence the action
or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon
any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he
is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any
letter or communication, in print or writing, in relation to such issue or matter
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than six months
or both." Ibid. This statute is the predecessor of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503-04 (1952).
54 Duke v. United States, 90 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1937).
55 Duke v. United States, 90 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1937).56 Id. at 841. (Emphasis added.)
57 Ibid.
58 Id. at 842. (Emphasis added.)
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It would thus seem that several possible interpretations exist
as to the federal statute on communications. One view is that any
communication is per se criminal. This is the impression left by the
cases on the subject. However, on careful examination those cases
reveal that some room for doubt exists as to whether "innocent"
communications are in fact included. For instance, in disposing of
one of defendant's arguments for quashing an indictment on the
ground that the grand jury "received unauthorized writings from
unauthorized persons," 5 the court in United States v. Sinyth,60
said:
The purpose of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1504 was to prevent anyone from attempting
to bring pressure upon or intimidate a grand juror by a written communication
with that intent. But that section does not prohibit a grand juror from
receiving a communication, written or oral. The grand jury could indict
anyone for a violation of that section if the requisite elements were present.
But not if they solicited a communication or indicated a willingness to receive
one; then the requisite intent would not be present and there would be no
crime.61
This certainly seems to indicate that an intent other than the mere
intent to send the communication is required and, in the light of the
stated purpose of the statute as indicated by the court, that intent
must be to influence, intimidate or bring pressure on the grand jury.
This latter view is further supported by the sentence added to
section 1504 in 1952, "Nothing in this section shall be construed
to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the
,grand jury." 62
Conimunications as Contempt
Communications which attempt to influence, corrupt or insult
a grand jury are punishable under the court's contempt powers as
an interference with the administration of justice. 63 It has been held
that a communication which on its face is libelous or shows an
attempt to corrupt or influence the grand jury is contemptuous and
the intent to send such a communication is sufficient to convict.64
That an area of uncertainty exists when a communication not on its
face actionable is involved may be seen in Fishback v. State,6 5 where
the Indiana court considers the problem. There, an affidavit by the
s United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
60 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
61 Id. at 299. (Emphasis added.)
62 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (1952).
63 11t re Cuddy, 131 U.S. 280 (1889) ; In re Tyler, 64 Cal. 434, 1 Pac. 884
(1884) ; Field v. Thornell, 106 Iowa 7, 75 N.W. 685 (1898) ; In re Cheeseman,
49 N.J.L. 115, 6 Atl. 513 (1886) ; State v. Doty, 32 N.J.L. 403 (1868).
64 People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, 30 N.E.2d 11 (1940).(; 131 Ind. 304, 30 N.E. 1088 (1892).
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defendant disclaiming any intent to interfere with the administration
of justice was taken as conclusive and the contempt was dismissed. 6
Although this treatment seems to be unique, the case indicates that
a problem of intent is involved. 67
The applicability of contempt proceedings to communications
with a federal grand jury is narrowed by statutes restricting the
court's contempt power itself.68 In United States v. American Mach.
Co.,69 a contempt citation for publishing certain pamphlets decrying
the effects of high jury awards was dismissed when the court held
that its power to punish for contempt was limited by statute.70 The
court found that in this case it could punish for contempt only if the
act complained of took place within the geographical presence of the
court or so close thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice.71
Even after a court finds that an act occurred within its contempt
jurisdiction, it is submitted that a further problem concerning intent
arises. For example, consider the Camnier case, 72 in which a lawyer
was held in contempt for sending harassing questionnaires to a
grand jury which had indicted one of his clients and which was
considering similar indictments against others. The lower court
considered the defendant's absence of intent to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice in mitigation of the penalty. 73  The court of
appeals affirmed the decision.74  The Supreme Court reversed be-
cause the defendant was found not to be an officer of the court within
the meaning of the statute, and so not within the contempt power
of the court.75 However, it is interesting to note that speaking of
the defendant's actions the Court said, "we find it unnecessary to
decide this but it is not out of place to say that no statute or rule
of court specifically prohibits conduct such as petitioner's." 76 As
to the applicability of section 1503 the Court continued, "of course
it does not cover this case because there is no charge that petitioner
attempted improperly to influence the jury or violate section 1503
in any other way." 77
When this decision was rendered and even when the indictment
was drawn, the Supreme Court knew of the existence of section 1504;
certainly if "the only intent required was the intent to send the
66 Ibid.
67 See People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 181 N.E. 617 (1932); People v.
Graydon, 333 Ill. 429, 164 N.E. 832 (1929).
08 18 U.S.C. §401 (1952).
69 116 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 In re Cammer, 122 F. Supp. 388 (D.D.C. 1954).
73 Ibid.
74 Cammer v. United States, 223 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
75 Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956).76Id. at 404.
77 Id. at 407.
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communications" 78 the conduct of the defendant here would clearly
be proscribed. By way of dicta the Court says that even if the
federal courts have contempt power in this case, what the defendant
did violates no law or rule of court. This would indicate that mere
sending of communications is not in itself a violation of section 1504
or a ground for contempt.79  In view of the disagreement and
confusion in the area of intent it cannot be denied that a problem
exists.8 0
Conclusion
It appears obvious that communications with a grand jury do
not involve the question of secrecy at all. Grand jury secrecy is not
violated by an outsider sending information to a grand jury. A
problem does arise, however, when we consider communications as
evidence. An indictment based solely on such evidence would be
quashed in states requiring legal evidence. In the federal courts,
apparently, an indictment will not be dismissed if based on improper
communications if the indictment is valid on its face. However, both
in states requiring legal evidence and in the federal jurisdictions, such
communications do not affect indictments which have a basis of other
evidence sufficient to indict. Furthermore, the defendant must come
forward and show the defects in an indictment before it will be
quashed.
The statutes punishing communications, and the court's power
to punish them by contempt as interferences with the administration
of justice, raise serious problems because of the uncertainty of the
type of intent required to make the act criminal. A strong regard
for fair play and the constitutional requirements of the criminal law
make a definitive clarification of this troublesome element desirable.
-8 See text accompanying note 54 supra.
-9 Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 407 (1956).
80 A further restriction upon the courts in this area is the freedom of the
press provision in the first amendment to the Constitution. When newspaper
publications are involved there must be present that extremely high degree of
the substantive evil which would justify punishment of the publications. See
Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1953). In this area it is
interesting to note the treatment of contempt charges arising from the circula-
tion of pamphlets which decried high jury awards and linked them with higher
insurance and the rising cost of living. The same pamphlets were involved
in three separate suits. Hoffman v. Perrucci, 117 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ;
United States v. American Mach. Co., 116 F. Supp. 160 (E.D. Wash. 1953);
Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, Inc., 176 Kan. 101, 269 P.2d 435 (1954).
Generally speaking, the courts weighed the freedom of the press guarantee of
the first amendment and determined that there was not present that degree of
danger to warrant contempt punishment
1959 ]
